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Migrant Remittances and
Skipped Generation Households:





Using data from the Nang Rong projects social survey (N=6,801 households)
and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews, I examine the relation-
ship between migrant remittances and the skipped generation household
structure. I find that the skipped generation household is a significant
determinant of in-kind remittances and the amount of remittances received
by the household. Surprisingly, although qualitative data suggest that
grandparents living in skipped generation households provide childcare for
the children of absent migrants, quantitative evidence reveals that these
households receive lower remittance amounts than other households. This
suggests that although an exchange motivation may be overlooked in the
remittance literature, it does not apply to migrant remittances as it does in the
broader literature on inter vivos intergenerational transfers.
Introduction
Migrant remittances involving transfers of money and goods from migrants
to their origin households are an important source of income and poverty
alleviation for migrants, their households, and their origin communities in
many parts of the developing world. International remittances constitute
one of the largest and most stable sources of money for developing econo-
mies, often exceeding international aid (Kapur and McHale, 2003; Taylor,
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1999; World Bank, 2006). Considering the large number of internal migrants
throughout the world (IOM, 2005; Roberts, 1997), remittances from these
migrants probably also constitute substantial amounts of money.
While migrant remittances and the underlying motivations for their
transfer have been the subject of many studies, changes in migration
patterns over the past several decades favoring the movement of women
have altered household arrangements, creating important implications for
remittance patterns. In particular, a growing body of literature in develop-
ing countries documenting “transnational motherhood,” and the internal
migration of women suggests the increasing incidence of children left
behind in the care of surrogate caregivers (Dreby, 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo
and Avila, 1997; Hirsch, 2003; Salazar Parreñas, 2005; Schmalzbauer, 2004).
These children of migrating parents reside in “skipped generation” house-
holds, in which grandparents are the primary care providers for their
grandchildren, and neither parent is present (Casper and Bryson, 1998).
Using a mixed-methods approach and data from a sample of house-
holds (N=6,801) from Nang Rong, Thailand, I examine the skipped genera-
tion household as a determinant of migrant remittances. I argue that the
remittance literature has been slow to consider quid-pro-quo exchanges as
a motivation guiding migrants’ intentions for sending remittances. While
the theoretical framework underlying much of the research on monetary
and material transfers between family members identifies exchange as an
underlying motive, there is little empirical work in the remittance literature
on the subject.
I attempt to fill this gap in the literature by suggesting that the associa-
tion between remittances and the skipped generation household represents
an opportunity for migrants to send money in exchange for time that
extended relatives spend engaged in childcare for the children of absent
migrant parents. I examine this process in a rural agrarian setting experienc-
ing rapid social, economic, and demographic change (including a high
incidence of migration). In what follows, I consider the theoretical and
empirical literature on migrant remittances, and the rationale for studying
exchange as an underlying motivation for remittances.
Review of the Literature
The New Economics of Labor Migration, perhaps the leading approach to
studying migrant remittances, views remittance transfers as part of a
household decision-making strategy to reduce risk and increase investment
opportunities in areas where credit, insurance and capital markets are
absent or imperfect (Massey et al., 1993; Taylor and Martin, 2001). Accord-
ing to this view, migrants send remittances to agricultural origin house-
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holds to insure then from risks associated with droughts, floods, blights or
famines (Stark and Lucas, 1988). In the absence of credit markets, migrants
also act as financial intermediaries alleviating capital constraints and creat-
ing investment opportunities for financing new farm technology or funding
a family business (Stark, 1991).
There are many similarities between the remittance literature and a
broader literature on intergenerational exchanges, and both can be viewed
from the perspective of the New Home Economics (e.g., Becker, 1993). In
both literatures, the household is seen as the fundamental decision-making
unit involving inter vivos1 transfers. Also, in both literatures, transfers
follow from either repayment of prior investment in education (Brown and
Poirine, 2005; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Lee et al., 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997;
Lin et al., 2003), enticements of strategic inheritance bequests (Bernheim et
al., 1985; de la Brière et al., 2002; Hoddinot, 1994; VanWey, 2004), or
insurance transfers sent in times of crisis (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo,
2006; Frankenberg et al., 2002; Yang and Choi, 2007). The underlying
motivations for these transfers include bargaining and altruism (Becker,
1993; Chaippori, 1992; Stark, 1984).
In the intergenerational support literature, there is yet another motiva-
tion for transfers. This is the exchange motive (Cox et al., 1987), which
involves payment of money for time given with help in day-to-day tasks
such as childcare or help with housework (Frankenberg et al., 2002; Lillard
and Willis, 1997; Secondi, 1997). Despite the similarities between the
intergenerational support and the remittance literatures, the latter has been
slow to incorporate exchange as an underlying motive. Yet, in many
contexts, exchange can be an important motivation for remittances. For
example, in areas where parents migrate away, leaving their children in the
care of relatives, family members living in the migration origin household
provide a considerable service to migrants by caring for their children. Such
children reside in a skipped generation household, and the possibility for
remittances to be exchanged for childcare provision is high.
Much of the literature on childhood separation from parents in devel-
oping countries has focused on a household division of labor inherent in the
skipped generation household, in which extended kin perform reproduc-
tive labor (i.e., caring for children in the parents’ absence) while the parental
generation perform productive labor, earning money to support those left
behind (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe, 1989; Peterson, 1993; Richter, 1996;
Lee, 2000; Schroder-Butterfill, 2004). Freedom from childcare responsibili-
1 Inter vivos refers to exchanges made within one’s lifetime, in distinction to inheritance
transfers made after one’s death.
166 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL
ties allows parents to migrate as target earners, who send remittances back
to the origin household.
Skipped generation households have been observed in international as
well as internal migration sending regions. Although there are differences
in the determinants and circumstances stemming from each type of migra-
tion (for example legal barriers to migration or transportation costs), there
are also parallels and common themes. Both are associated with structural
inequalities between migration sending and receiving regions. In sending
regions, poverty and job scarcity act as push factors encouraging young
migrant parents to leave. In receiving regions, job availability and a demand
for migrant labor act as pull factors.
In the context of internal migration, structural inequalities are associ-
ated with a shift from a rural agrarian to an urban industrial economy
(Richter, 1996). In historical and contemporary pre-industrial settings, there
was little concern of discernible loss of productivity or danger to children
related to agricultural labor. Care for children was balanced with produc-
tive labor by combining non-mechanized agriculture and piecework with
child supervision (Degler, 1980; Roos, 1985; Stycos and Weller, 1967).2
As industrialization proceeded, societies experienced a number of
interrelated changes and dislocations that made it more difficult to maintain
this balance (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Presser 1986; Rindfuss et al.,
2003; Weller, 1977). Worksites in manufacturing and service industries
located at a distance from the home (usually in cities) force many to
commute or even migrate away in order to participate in the labor force.
Work schedules set by employers lacked the flexibility required for raising
children. Modern mechanized workplaces pose many dangers to young
children’s safety, and the presence of children at work jeopardized produc-
tivity. This made it necessary to care for children away from the workplace
(Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000).
Formal childcare options, themselves the product of economic transi-
tion, remain underdeveloped or out of reach for relatively poor, transient
urban migrants. Yet, parents who desire to participate in an industrial
economy cannot migrate (or remain migrants) if they do not have someone
with whom to leave the children. Thus, parents facing the prospect of
migration and separation from their children have to find substitute care
providers. In many contexts, parents choose to leave their children with
relatives, especially the maternal grandmother (Hashimoto, 1991;
Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997; Knodel and Saengtienchai, 2007;
2 For an alternative view that sees balancing work and childrearing responsibility as more
challenging see Desai and Jain (1994).
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Richter et al., 1992; Richter, 1996; Schmalzbauer, 2004; Schoder-Butterfill,
2004), a choice rooted in cultural tradition and strategic availability.
Childcare provided by extended relatives was historically common in
developed countries, and still exists throughout the developing world, even
for parents who are not migrants (Chen et al., 2000; Hermalin et al., 1998).
It is easy to see, therefore, that childcare provided by extended kin could be
a vital service for migrating parents, especially in contexts characterized by
rapid urbanization and industrialization where local wage opportunities
are limited. To understand how remittances and skipped generation house-
hold structures are related within such a setting, I describe Nang Rong,
Thailand, the backdrop for this paper. I focus on the household economy,
migration patterns, and available childcare options for migrating parents.
The Setting
Nang Rong is an agrarian district located in Buriram province, Northeast
Thailand, near the Cambodian border. The district was a frontier region
during the first six decades of the 20th century (Entwisle et al., 1998; Rindfuss
et al., 2007). Following the closing of the frontier, road construction, electri-
fication, telecommunications improvements and migration substantially
changed the way of life there (Curran, 1995).
Rain-fed paddy rice cultivation is central to the economy and most
Nang Rong residents are poor subsistence farmers who sell only their excess
yields. Some grow upland cash crops like cassava for export to foreign
markets (Curran, 2005). Households usually farm small plots located in
agricultural fields surrounding nucleated villages. Although some indus-
trial development in the district has led to scattered industry, the level of
non-agricultural employment remains low (VanWey, 2003). Many house-
holds supplement agricultural activities by participating in cottage indus-
tries such as silk weaving, silk worm raising, mat weaving, or other such
activities. A few operate small stores or businesses. While a few local wage
positions are available, wages are lower compared to potential earnings in
cities like Bangkok. Consequently, many villagers choose to migrate away
from the district.
Out-migration in Nang Rong is common. Indeed, migration rates in the
Northeast region are higher than other major regions in Thailand (Goldstein,
1987; Chamratrithirong et al., 1995; Pejaranonda et al., 1995). My discus-
sions with villagers suggest that poverty, job scarcity, debt, and the shift to
a money economy motivate young people to leave rural villages in search
of better-paying jobs on construction sites and factories. Migrants head to
both rural and urban destinations (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995; VanWey,
2004). The former is thought to be associated with marriage while the latter
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is for labor. Most migration is within Thailand, although a few people travel
abroad to countries like Taiwan, South Korea or the Gulf States. Major
destinations for urban migrants include Bangkok, the Eastern Seaboard (a
development region south of Bangkok), and Korat (a.k.a., Nakhon
Ratchasima) the largest provincial city in Buriram. Much migration in Nang
Rong is seasonal or circular, which is linked to labor demand fluctuations
related to the agricultural cycle (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995; Richter et al.,
1997).
Preliminary results using the Nang Rong data shows that migration is
selective of young adults (roughly in the ages 15-39 in 2000, who make up
almost 87 percent of all migrants). Work in Nang Rong by Rindfuss (1991)
notes that young adults are conspicuously absent in rural villages. Those
present include only middle-aged and elderly adults, as well as the small
children of absent young adults. The ostensible absence of young people
exists in other parts of the Northeast as well (Phongphit and Hewison, 2001).
The 1990 Thai Census shows that compared with other migration flows
throughout Thailand, a far smaller portion of rural-to-urban migrants are
children (Pejaranonda et al., 1995). This may suggest that parents who
migrate from rural villages to cities do so alone, while their children remain
in rural villages. It is also possible that migrants leave their villages, marry
and have children, and send children back to live with relatives in rural
areas as suggested by Jampaklay (2006) and Richter (1996).
Traditionally, childcare from maternal relatives was common, as North-
east Thai newlyweds practiced matrilocal postnuptial customs whereby
they moved in with the wife’s family for a short time following marriage
(Limanonda, 1995; Limanonda and Kowantanakul, 2002; Tan, 2002). Most
of the villagers with whom I spoke said it was common for migrating
parents to leave their children in the care of maternal relatives, especially the
child’s maternal grandmother.
Nang Rong parents have limited childcare options if they choose to
migrate, and evidence suggests that formal childcare institutions in cities
and non-relative care are not popular choices (Richter et al., 1992; Richter,
1996). Richter’s qualitative data from a sample of Bangkok mothers found
a high degree of conflict and distrust of non-relative childcare. Perhaps
because formal care was new during the period of Richter’s study, only a
few respondents actually used such facilities, and some described neglect
and poor quality care in these settings. It is likely that the added expense of
formal childcare is prohibitive for many migrants, and that their effective-
ness as target earners would be reduced if they did not take advantage of
relatively inexpensive childcare from extended relatives living in origin
communities.
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Basic Approach
To understand the connection between the skipped generation household
and receipt of remittances by migration origin households, I use insights
from a combination of semi-structured qualitative interviews, descriptive
statistics and regression models. The dependent variables include measures
of remittances, detailing the sending of monetary and in-kind remittances
and the amount of monetary remittances sent. I limit remittances to only
those sent by migrants who have moved outside of Nang Rong district, for
a period of at least one year. Doing so ensures that migrants have moved
sufficiently far that they cannot themselves care for their children. It also
ensures that they are gone for a sufficiently long time to be able to generate
enough money to send remittances.
The main independent variable is a measure of whether the household
has a skipped generation structure. I expect that, everything else being
equal, such households should be more likely to receive remittances (both
money and in-kind) and should receive higher amounts of remittances. This
expectation relates to the idea that relatives receive remittances in exchange
for time providing childcare to children of absent migrants. To separate the
effect of the skipped generation household from other factors related to
remittances, I control for measures of household demographics indicating
the family’s dependency burden, such as separate variables for the number
of people of non-working (13 and younger and 50 and older) and working
age (14-49),3 and the number of migrants. I also include measures of the
household economy, such as indications of alternative wage-generating
activities (cottage industries, local factory labor income, raising of animals
for sale or barter, growing cassava), uses of income (e.g., paying for labor for
rice, cassava, or sugar cane harvesting and purchase of herbicides and
pesticides), and physical capital (e.g., household wealth and land holdings).
I also consider the household’s susceptibility to risk of crop loss from
flooding or drought.
One problem with examining the independent effect of the skipped
generation structure on the household’s receipt of remittances is that both
the receipt of remittances and the formation of the skipped generation
structure are related to the migration decision of parents. Consequently, the
skipped generation structure may not have an exogenous effect on remit-
tance receipt. To address this issue, I estimate a series of recursive models
3 Prior fieldwork in Nang Rong suggests that rural farmers in this region begin to experience
physical wear and tear, making it difficult to continue doing demanding physical labor much
beyond their 50s.
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in which I jointly estimate the determinants of remittance outcomes and of
the skipped generation household. In these models, the skipped generation
structure is used as a dependent variable in its own equation, as well as an
independent variable for the remittance equations. As shown by Greene
(2003), despite the endogeneity of the skipped generation variable in the
remittance equations, this modeling approach yields consistent results.
As determinants of the skipped generation structure, I include mea-
sures of household demographics, such as the number of men and women
of working age (14-49) and age 50 or older. Fieldwork suggests that
grandparents of children of migrating parents are generally in their 50s.
Therefore, having household members of this age should make it more
likely that a skipped generation household will form, particularly if there
are women in this age range. This is because maternal grandmothers are
especially likely to care for the children of absent migrants. I control for
working age household members to account for the possibility that aunts or
uncles residing in the household also help with childcare. I also control for
measures of demographic characteristics of migrants, using counts disag-
gregated by sex and marital status. Given that marriage signifies the
beginning of family formation for many Thais, the number of married
migrants (both males and females) ought to be positively related to the
skipped generation household structure.
Measures of household agricultural involvement (i.e., animal hus-
bandry and rice cultivation) and of household wealth are also included in
the model. The former is included to account for factors that may interfere
with household members’ ability to raise children of absent migrants. The
latter controls for differences in socioeconomic status that could influence
the likelihood of leaving children with extended relatives.
To identify the skipped generation equation, I include a variable that
affects the formation of the skipped generation household, but is exogenous
to the remittance equation. For such a variable, I use a measure of the
number of married women residing in the household, who are younger than
50, who use one of the following forms of contraception: oral contraceptive
(the pill), intrauterine device (IUD), condom or injection. It is unlikely that
contraceptive use causes households to receive remittances.4 Moreover, the
use of contraception among migrant women is likely to reduce childbear-
ing, and thus the formation of a skipped generation household.
Unfortunately, data on migrant women’s contraceptive choices are not
available. However, research on contraceptive choice in Nang Rong by
4 The World Health Organization reports that family planning programs in Thailand that
provide contraceptives are extensive (even available in parts of rural Thailand), convenient,
and largely free of charge (WHO 2009).
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Godley (2001) and Entwisle et al. (1996), argues that the choice of method
(including the choice not to use any method) is influenced by social network
connections to friends or kin. As origin households anchor migrant net-
works, and provide an ongoing source of information to migrants (Roberts
and Morris, 2004), it is reasonable to suspect that migrant women develop
similar contraceptive practices to those found among women in their origin
households.
The analysis is well suited to investigate the association between the
skipped generation household and remittances as an indication of an
exchange motivation. The data contain detailed information on a number of
households, making it possible to examine the influence of the skipped
generation pattern net of several other factors. Also, qualitative data aid in
the interpretation of results, overcoming some of the shortcomings of a
purely quantitative approach. Furthermore, the data have measures of both
in-kind and monetary remittances. It is interesting to examine both, since
they may represent a different level of awareness for the needs of the
household. While money is a fungible asset that can be used to purchase any
number of goods and services, transfers of such in-kind goods as food,
clothing and appliances may be responsive to the particular needs of the
home household. Specifically, migrant parents may provide food or cloth-
ing for their children.
The analysis also has some limitations. First, the approach cannot rule
out altruism or bargaining motivations as alternatives to exchange. How-
ever, my intention is not to suggest that exchange is the only motivation for
remittances. Rather, it is to suggest that it is an overlooked motivation that
should be more prominently considered in the remittance literature. Sec-
ond, the quantitative data do not contain explicit measures of childcare
provided by household members. I make up for this shortcoming by
drawing on my qualitative data, which are aimed in part at understanding
the nature of care provided by grandparents and other relatives. These data
provide broad evidence that grandparents become primary care providers
for children of absent parents. Third, because of the way the data were
collected, some people who the household considers to be migrants are not
counted as such in the data. Most likely, an undercount of these individuals
will reduce the remittance effect, but this effect should not be substantial.
Another shortcoming relates to the effect of past remittances. Remit-
tances received by the household prior to the period under study may have
funded ventures that became major sources of household income. Since
measures of income-generating activities are included on the right-side of
the remittance equation, their inclusion could lead to endogeneity bias if
such past remittances are not taken into account. To address this issue, I
conduct a sensitivity analysis in which I estimate all models with the
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inclusion of another independent variable that measures the amount of
remittances received in the previous panel (1994). Unfortunately, not all
households were eligible to receive such remittances, due to the way that
migration was defined for the purposes of data collection. As such, the
models that include this extra measure of remittances must use a different
sample than the analytical sample. I acknowledge that dissimilar results
across models could be due to differences in the sample or in model
specification. I address this issue further in the results and conclusion
sections, and I include more details about the definition of migration used
in data collection in the subsequent section.
Data and Sample
Quantitative data come from the 2000 wave of the Nang Rong Projects
Social Survey. Data on various social and demographic characteristics were
collected in three successive data panels (1984, 1994 and 2000). At each
wave, a complete census was conducted of all households in the original 51
villages, sampled within the Nang Rong district. Using a key informant
from each household, data were obtained on all household members in
residence, as well as proxy reports for any former household members
living outside of the household. Information was collected on socio-demo-
graphic characteristics of each household member, the migration and
remittance behavior of migrants, and about characteristics of the household
itself, such as its farming activities and ownership of various assets.
The analytical sample includes 6,801 households. The Nang Rong
household survey only obtained data on migration and remittances from
households having records on two consecutive panels. This is because the
survey defined migration as a change in residence between panels. Mi-
grants are defined as any living individuals, about whom information was
collected on a previous panel, who were living away from their origin
village for two or more continuous months. As only households having data
from the previous panel could potentially have migrants, only these house-
holds existing in the 1994 and 2000 panels are included in the analytical
sample. Therefore, households included in the sample are not representa-
tive of all Nang Rong households. In particular, they are less representative
of younger, newly formed households and those that moved into the district
most recently. For the sensitivity analysis using the measure of past remit-
tances (in 1994), I follow the same logic, and further limit the sample to
households having data on all prior panels (i.e., 1984 and 1994; N = 4,430).
I also limit the analytical sample to only those having complete data on all
variables used in the analysis. Using listwise deletion, I eliminated 33
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households having missing data. These households represent less than  one
percent of the original sample, and should have a negligible effect on results.
Data for the qualitative portion come from semi-structured interviews
conducted in Nang Rong villages in February 2005. Seven villages through-
out Nang Rong district were selected on a non-probability basis as sites for
data collection. These villages were chosen with the intention of capturing
variability in village contexts (e.g., distance to the nearest town, the presence
of international migrants, distance to irrigation canals and the cultivation of
cash crops). Interview subjects were recruited using a combination of
convenience and snowball sampling. The qualitative data are not intended
to be representative of the entire population of Nang Rong, rather they were
selected to provide insights into the interpretation of quantitative results.
Qualitative interviews targeted individuals who had experienced
childcare arrangements involving migrant parents living away from chil-
dren. Villagers who were otherwise knowledgeable about such arrange-
ments were also interviewed. A total of 41 interviews were conducted with
the following:  seven village headmen,  two village officials knowledgeable
about childcare (a public health worker and a nursery school teacher), 26
relatives (mostly maternal grandmothers) caring for the children of absent
migrants,  three former migrants whose children were cared for by relatives,
two parents whose spouses were migrants, and  one non-kin childcare
provider.
Measures
Using household survey items which asked whether individual migrants
sent any money or goods to the household within the last 12 months, I
measure remittances in three ways: 1) as a dummy variable indicating
whether any monetary remittances were received by the household, 2) as a
similar variable for whether in-kind remittances were received, or 3) as the
amount of monetary remittances sent. In-kind remittances include transfers
of clothing, food (priced 100 baht5 or more), electrical appliances, household
goods or vehicles. The amount send was measured in broad categories to
reduce recall error. The categories (in baht) include: no money, 1-1000, 1001-
3000, 3001-5000, 5001-10000, 10001-20000, 20001-40000, 40001 and over.
Following work by Hull (2007) and Piotrowski (2008), I constructed an
overall measure of the amount of remittances sent to the household by
taking the midpoint of each category and summing it over all migrants.
5 The baht is the Thai unit of currency. In 2000, 1 baht equaled approximately 40 USD.
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 The skipped generation household is measured as a dichotomous
variable for whether both of the parents of any child (defined as someone
aged 13 or younger) residing in the household were absent. Information on
parents’ residence was taken from their records on the household census
roster. In the event that parents were not listed on the roster, additional
information was taken from a variable which collected information about
the location of the parents of each individual listed on the roster. Note that
if members of the parental generation (such as siblings) live in the house-
hold, I still consider the household to have a skipped generation structure.
Turning to measures of control variables, I only describe select vari-
ables, as measures for the remaining variables are straightforward and self-
explanatory. Household demographic counts of working and non-working
age people are constructed from household roster records of individuals
residing in the household. Counts of additional household migrants are also
constructed in this way, but include members who were living outside of the
village for two or more consecutive months at the time of the survey (i.e.,
they are defined using the same definition used in the household survey).
The measure of involvement in cottage industries is a dichotomous
variable for whether anyone in the household is engaged in silk weaving,
silk worm raising, cloth weaving, charcoal making, and collecting or cutting
firewood. The measure of income from local factories includes wages in the
last three months earned at nearby factories or towns in districts such as
Nang Rong, Non Suwan, Chamni or Chalaermprakit. Animals raised for
sale or barter include cows, water buffalo, ducks, chickens and fish. The
variable is measured as an indicator of whether the household raised one or
more of these animal types. In terms of income expenditures, the use of paid
labor for harvesting rice, cassava, and sugar cane and whether the house-
hold uses pesticides or herbicides in the 1999-2000 growing season are
measured as separate dummy variables.
Since monetary values of assets and income are not available in the
Nang Rong data, I create an index of household resources in order to
develop a comprehensive picture of wealth. I combine measures of con-
sumer durables and characteristics of the dwelling unit following work by
Filmer and Prichett (2001). The index uses the first principal component as
a weight for an additive index of assets.6 Since some of the assets are
measured at the nominal level, I use a polychoric principal components
6 Asset measures include the number of televisions, VCRs, cell phones, refrigerators,
washing machines, sewing machines, itans (agricultural trucks), bicycles, motorcycles, and
cars/trucks/pickups owned by the household. I also include measures for whether the
dwelling unit has glass paned windows or bug screens or is one or two stories tall, and whether
the household cooks with electricity or gas.
REMITTANCES AND SKIPPED GENERATION HOUSEHOLDS 175
procedure (see Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004). Using the raw index, I group
households into wealth tertiles (i.e., top third, middle third, bottom third).7
Analytical Approach
To relate remittance propensity (i.e., whether monetary or in-kind goods
were received by the household) measures to a set of independent and
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7 The procedure uses all Nang Rong households in sample villages to construct the index,
while only households included in the analytical sample are included in the analysis.
Therefore, the proportion of households in Table 1 does not conform exactly to the expected
tertile breakdown.
176 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL
ρ
jk




 (j,k = 1,2,3;  j ¹ k). I
estimate the model using Stata’s mvprobit command, which uses simulated
maximum likelihood (SML) using the Geweke-Hajivassiliour-Keane (GHK)
simulator to evaluate the multivariate normal distribution (see Cappellari
and Jenkins, 2003 for details).
Regarding the amount sent, many of the households did not receive any
remittances. Therefore, their records are zero-censored. To deal with this
situation, I use a Tobit regression model. To deal with the endogeneity of the
skipped generation household structure in the remittance amount equa-
tion, I follow a similar procedure to the one outlined earlier. I estimate a
recursive mixed process model, in which I simultaneously estimate a tobit
equation of remittance amount and a probit equation of the determinants of
the skipped generation household. Once again, the skipped generation
household variable is included on the right-hand side of the remittance
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*  when y
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* is > 0, but y
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 = 0 when y
1i
*  ≤ 0 (Tobin 1958, Wooldridge
2006). All other variables and parameters are similar to those in the earlier
model. This routine also uses simulated maximum likelihood and the GHK
simulator (see Roodman, 2007 for details).
To determine the magnitude of the effect of skipped generation house-
hold structure in the remittance equations, I calculate micro-simulated
predicted probabilities for the probit equations and the expected value that
the dependent variable is greater than zero for the tobit equation. I calculate
two separate quantities. For the first, I constrain every household to be a
non-skipped generation household. For the second, I constrain them all to
be skipped generation households. I then compare the difference between
the two average values, which shows the magnitude of the effect of the
skipped generation variable. To account for the clustering of households in
villages and for any unobserved heterogeneity at the household-level, I use
robust standard errors that correct for these issues (see White, 1980).
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES, NANG RONG HOUSEHOLDS IN 2000
Variable Mean Std Dev
Remittances
Household Received Monetary Remittances 0.38 0.49
Household Received In-Kind Remittances 0.25 0.43
Amount of Monetary Remittances Sent (baht) 5307.26 11595.52
Household Demographics
Skipped generation household 0.13 0.34
Members age 13 or Younger (count) 1.03 0.99
Members age 14-49 years (count) 2.11 1.33
Males (count) 1.02 0.87
Females (count) 1.09 0.80
Members age 50 and older (count) 0.96 0.87
Males (count) 0.43 0.51
Females (count) 0.53 0.56
Number of Migrants (count) 1.74 1.85
Married, Male (count) 0.57 0.89
Married, Female (count) 0.44 0.78
Unmarried, Male (count) 0.34 0.63
Unmarried, female (count) 0.27 0.56
Household Economy
Married Women Using Contraceptives (count) 0.33 0.50
Participates in Cottage Industry 0.84 0.37
Wage Income from Local Factories (baht) 1076.46 5119.53
Owns Store, Market Stall, or Car for Peddling Goods 0.07 0.26
Raises Animals for Sale or Barter 0.44 0.50
Grow Rice 0.76 0.43
Grow Cassava 0.08 0.27
Uses Paid Labor for Rice, Cassava, or Sugar Cane Harvest 0.46 0.50
Uses Pesticide or Herbicide 0.26 0.44
Amount of Land Used for Farming (in Wah) 6458.14 8996.31
Position in Household Wealth Distribution
Bottom Third 0.31 0.46
Middle Third 0.34 0.47
Top Third 0.35 0.48
Ever Lost Crops due to Flooding or Drought 0.61 0.49
N 6801
Results
Table 1, which shows descriptive statistics for all variables, reveals that 38
percent of all households received money, 25 percent received in-kind
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remittances, and the average monetary amount was approximately 5,307
baht (about 133 USD). Thirteen percent of households have skipped genera-
tion structures. Qualitative interviews shed some light on the internal
dynamics of skipped generation households. They confirm that during the
parents’ absence, maternal grandparents, especially the maternal grand-
mother, assume primary care responsibilities for the children.
The majority of interviewees (90 percent) indicated that grandmothers
are involved in several facets of care giving, including cooking for their
grandchildren, washing their clothes, playing with them, taking them to
school in the morning, and sometimes bathing them (depending on the age
of the child). Grandfathers and aunts also help the grandmother in provid-
ing care, by doing such things as taking children to the public health center
to get vaccinations. While grandmothers are largely responsible for taking
care of their grandchild’s well-being, parents are usually responsible for
taking care of financial aspects of the children’s needs. The following
interview with a maternal grandmother taking care of her 10-year old
granddaughter exemplifies a typical caretaking arrangement:
Interviewer: I will ask you about “Aing.” So she is 10 years old and
studying now?
Grandmother: Yes, when the semester ends she’ll be in grade 5.
Interviewer: Who pays for her school fees?
Grandmother: Her mother.
Interviewer: Do you cook for her?
Grandmother: Yes; and I have to prepare some rice for her to eat at
school.
Interviewer: On the weekend do you cook?
Grandmother: Yes
Interviewer: Who pays for her clothes?
Grandmother: Her mother provides them.
Interviewer: Who takes her to see the doctor if she is sick?
Grandmother: If it’s minor, I will do it, but if it isn’t, her aunt will handle
it.
Only 11 villagers (26 percent) offered reasons for why children cannot
stay at their parents’ destination. They said that many parents move to
cities, which are expensive places to live. Typically both parents work long
hours, and even if they share a room with other people, no one has time to
care for children. The cost of hiring a baby sitter is usually prohibitive, and
leaving children in rural areas is more affordable. Villagers also expressed
a distrust of non-relative childcare.
About half of the villagers described a familiar life course pattern
followed by many young people. Before they become parents, young
people migrate to find work after completing primary school. While in their
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twenties, they often find a marriage partner at the destination. When
women become pregnant, some return to rural origin villages to give birth,
in part because of the expense of delivering a baby in an urban hospital.
Mothers usually stay with their baby for three months, the maximum time
Thai labor laws grant for maternity leave. Afterwards, mothers typically
return to work in the city, perhaps joining their husband. Parents rarely see
their children except on holidays like Songkran day, (the Thai New Year),
or special occasions like Election day. Children seldom visit their parents in
migration destinations. Separation from parents can be lengthy, at times
lasting the duration of the childhood of the offspring.
Table 2 shows the results of regression models for whether the house-
hold received monetary or in-kind remittances. Results suggest that the
skipped generation household structure, net of several other household
variables, is a significant determinant of receipt of monetary and in-kind
remittances as well as monetary remittance amount. The skipped genera-
tion pattern is positively related to each type of remittance. Predicted
probabilities (not shown in table) indicate that the probability of receiving
remittances changes from 48 percent to 34 percent for non-skipped genera-
tion and skipped-generation households, respectively (a difference of 14
percentage points). For in-kind remittances, the analogous change is from
23 percent to 30 percent, a seven percent difference.
Qualitative data suggest that remittance money from parents was used
to offset the costs of basic living and educational expenses. The need for cash
drives many parents to leave their children behind. Frequently, having only
one target earner does not provide sufficient money for the household. An
interview with a grandmother illustrates the division of labor involving
parents and grandparents:
Interviewer: Is it a common thing that locals here usually go to work
in Bangkok and leave their children with grandparents?
Grandmother: Mostly, yes. They leave to work.
Interviewer: Why doesn’t one parent go to work alone while the other
parent looks after the child here?
Grandmother: It is necessary for them to earn more money…
Interviewer: Do you know what the cause [of this situation] is?
Grandmother: I think the cause is economic.…
Interviewer: Did you bring up your daughter yourself?
Grandmother: Yes.
Interviewer: So why don’t parents bring up their own children also?
Grandmother: They have no time. It can’t be helped. They support me
by sending me some money to pay for expenses. I think
I’m like an employee.
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Additional descriptive statistics from the quantitative data (not shown
in table) indicate that remittances from parents are common. Considering
the universe of all children (age 13 or younger) residing in the village,
approximately eleven percent of them have both parents in migration
destinations outside of Nang Rong villages. The majority of parents, 73
percent, live in the same broad migration destination.8 Of the cases for
which remittance data are available,9 the data suggest that money, food and
clothes are the most common forms of remittances sent to the household.
Mothers are more likely to send each of these (81 percent send money;  46
percent, clothes; 46 percent, food) than fathers (67 percent sent money; 33
percent, clothes; 34 percent, food).
Returning to results from the models, several of the control variables are
also significant. I now turn to those variables. Interestingly, as the number
of young people (age 13 or younger) in the household increases, the
likelihood of the household receiving any money or in-kind goods de-
creases. Although some of the children measured by this variable live in a
skipped generation household, many of these children have one or both
parents living in them. Therefore, migrants may be less willing to provide
money or support to children of other family members. Taken together,
these results suggest that remittances are not affected by children per se, but
by the children’s living situation, which is likely to be related to payment for
the exchange of services.
As the number of household migrants increases, so does the likelihood
of receiving both types of remittances. This effect is expected. Having more
migrants increases the chance that the origin household receives remit-
tances. The only other significant demographic effect is for the number of
older household members (age 50 and older) on the likelihood of sending
remittances. This effect may be related to filial support of aging parents. The
effects of variables measuring alternative forms of cash flow are generally
unrelated to the likelihood of receiving either money or in-kind remittances.
The only exceptions are ownership of a store, market stall or car for peddling
goods, which both have negative effects on receiving monetary remittances.
8 The Nang Rong data only contain information on whether the migration destination is in
a particular Nang Rong village, district, province or country (whatever is relevant to the
particular migrant).
9 As mentioned previously, not everyone who migrated from the household is defined as
a migrant in the data set. Therefore, not everyone has remittance data. Given that maternal
relatives usually care for the children of absent parents, mothers’ migration experiences are
more likely to be measured than fathers’ experiences. The analysis of remittance for this portion
of the paper is based on data from 555 mothers and 236 fathers.
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These ventures may generate enough money that the household does not
need remittances. Also, using paid labor for crop harvesting has a positive
effect on the propensity to receive both types of remittances, perhaps
indicating that households having a need for income to pay workers have
a greater capacity to extract money from migrants.
Regarding physical capital, households in the bottom third of the
wealth distribution were less likely to receive money and goods compared
to those in the middle third of the distribution. Their disadvantaged
position probably makes it difficult for migrants from these households to
get the education needed to find adequate jobs that pay them sufficiently to
be able to send money back to their origin household. Households in the top
third of the wealth distribution are more likely to get in-kind remittances.
Finally, households that ever lost crops due to flooding or drought, an
indication of risk involved in agriculture, are also more likely to receive
monetary remittances.
Turning to the equation predicting the skipped generation structure, as
the number of older people in the household increases (both men and
women), so does the probability of the skipped generation structure.
Perhaps these individuals are grandparents who care for their grandchil-
dren in their parents’ absence. The number of working age males is nega-
tively related to the skipped generation structure. As expected, the number
of married migrant men and women increases the likelihood of a skipped
generation household. Conversely, the number of unmarried females de-
creases its likelihood. The measure of contraceptive use is also significant
and in the expected negative direction. Wealth effects reveal that the
skipped generation structure is more common among wealthier house-
holds. Compared to those in the middle of the wealth distribution, those at
the bottom have a lower likelihood of exhibiting the skipped generation
structure, while those at the top have a higher likelihood.
Correlation coefficients indicate that the monetary and in-kind remit-
tance equations are highly correlated (r =.87), and this correlation is statis-
tically significant. Thus, these models should not be estimated as indepen-
dent equations. Also, the skipped generation equation is significantly
correlated with the in-kind remittance effect, although the correlation is not
high (r =.10).
Table 3 shows results for the amount of money received by the house-
hold. Contrary to expectations, skipped generation households receive less
money, on average, than non-skipped generation households. The expected
value that the amount of remittances sent is greater than zero (not shown in
table) is 15,710.03 baht for skipped generation households, and 12,262.39
baht for non-skipped generation households, a difference of 3,447.64 baht
(about 86 USD). Thus, although skipped-generation households are more
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likely to receive monetary remittances, they receive lower amounts. This
may suggest that other motivations, such as risk reduction, investment or
filial support are more significant determinants of remittance amount.
The effects of other variables are largely consistent with earlier results.
Demographic counts of younger and working-age household members are
negatively related to the amount received, and the number of migrants is
positively related to this outcome. Indications of alternative forms of
money-generating activities such as local factory labor, store ownership
and cassava cultivation are all negatively related to the amount received.
The use of paid labor for harvesting is again positively related to amount
received. Households at the bottom third of the wealth distribution receive
lower amounts relative to those in the middle tertile, while those at the top
receive higher amounts. Also, skipped generation equation variables largely
have similar effects.
Tables 4 and 5 contain results from the sensitivity analysis using a
measure of past remittances. Recall that this sample is limited to households
having records on all three data panels. Although results for many variables
are robust across these models and the models using the larger analytical
sample, the effect of the skipped generation variable on monetary remit-
tances is not significant. It is unclear whether this disparity is due to
differences in model specification or to differences in sample. Further
analysis, (available upon request) in which the effect of prior remittances
was excluded from the model using the more limited sample, reveals that
the skipped generation effect is also non-significant. Thus, differences in
sampling alone could account for the difference. However, this is not to say
that prior remittance has no effect as well. In any event, these results call into
question the finding that the skipped generation household is more likely
to receive monetary remittances.
Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between remittances and the
skipped generation household as an indication of exchange of money for
services. The setting is Nang Rong, Thailand, a rural developing region
undergoing substantial social, economic and demographic changes in the
last several decades. Results show that various measures of remittances
(i.e., in-kind remittances and the amount sent) are significantly related to the
skipped generation household structure, net of controls for household
demographics and the household economy. Results hold even after the
endogeneity of the skipped generation household in the remittance equa-
tions is taken into account.
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TABLE 4
MULTIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATES OF REMITTANCES AND
SKIPPED GENERATION STRUCTURE, SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR PRIOR REMITTANCES
Monetary In-Kind Skipped
Remittances Remittances Generation
Variable Coeff StdErra Coeff StdErra Coeff Std Erra
Intercept -0.63*** 0.10 -1.14*** 0.10 -1.12*** 0.09
Household Demographics
Skipped generation household 0.21 0.13 0.29* 0.12 — —
Members age 13 or
Younger (count) -0.07*** 0.02 -0.04 0.03 — —
Members age 14-49 yrs. (count) -0.08*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 — —
Males (count) — — — — -0.19*** 0.03
Females (count) — — — — -0.09* 0.04
Members age 50
and older (count) 0.09** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 — —
Males (count) — — — — 0.10 0.05
Females (count) — — — — 0.06 0.05
Number of Migrants (count) 0.26*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.02 — —
Married, Male (count) — — — — 0.10*** 0.03
Married, Female (count) — — — — 0.40*** 0.02
Unmarried, Male (count) — — — — -0.04 0.04
Unmarried, female (count) — — — — -0.12** 0.04
Household Economy
Amount of Montary Remittances
Received in 1994 (in 1,000 baht) 0.02*** 0.003 0.01*** 0.003 — —
Married Women Using
Contraceptives (count) — — — — -0.13* 0.06
Participates in Cottage Industry 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 — —
Wage Income from Local
Factories (baht, log) -0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 — —
Owns Store, Market Stall, or
Car for Peddling Goods -0.16 0.10 -0.08 0.09 — —
Raises Animals for Sale or Barter -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06
Grow Rice — — — — -0.07 0.06
Grow Cassava -0.14 0.10 -0.06 0.08 — —
Uses Paid Labor for Rice, Cassava,
or Sugar Cane Harvest 0.11* 0.05 0.15** 0.05 — —
Uses Pesticide or Herbicide -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 — —
Amount of Land Used for
Farming (in Wah, log) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 — —
Position in Household Wealth
Distribution (Ref = Middle Third)
Bottom Third -0.19*** 0.05 -0.20*** 0.05 -0.16** 0.06
Top Third 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.17** 0.06
Ever Lost Crops due to Flooding




Monetary Remittances — —
In-Kind Remittances 0.85*** 0.01 — —
Skipped Generation Household 0.20*** 0.06 0.11 0.06 — —
NOTES: aRobust standard errors corrected for village-level clustering
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (Two-Tailed Test)
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TABLE 5
MIXED PROCESS ESTIMATES OF AMOUNT OF REMITTANCES (TOBIT) AND SKIPPED
GENERATION STRUCTURE (PROBIT), SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR PRIOR REMITTANCES
Amount of Skipped
Remittances Generation
Variable Coeff Std Erra Coeff Std Erra
Intercept -8923.95*** 1712.22 -1.13*** 0.09
Household Demographics
Skipped generation household -13403.73*** 2511.12 — —
Members age 13 or Younger (count) -1084.28*** 287.88 — —
Members age 14-49 years (count) -2028.08*** 430.11 — —
Males (count) — — -0.17*** 0.03
Females (count) — — -0.13*** 0.04
Members age 50 and older (count) 1363.09** 476.98 — —
Males (count) — — 0.06 0.05
Females (count) — — 0.08 0.05
Number of Migrants (count) 4735.81*** 342.27 — —
Married, Male (count) — — 0.15*** 0.02
Married, Female (count) — — 0.40*** 0.02
Unmarried, Male (count) — — -0.04 0.04
Unmarried, female (count) — — -0.16*** 0.04
Household Economy
Amount of Montary Remittances
Received in 1994 (in 1,000 baht) 317.23*** 32.93 — —
Married Women Using Contraceptives (count) — — -0.13* 0.06
Participates in Cottage Industry -356.35 1066.13 — —
Wage Income from Local Factories (baht, log) -470.47*** 133.03 — —
Owns Store, Market Stall, or Car
for Peddling Goods -2529.76 1624.95 — —
Raises Animals for Sale or Barter -848.10 794.28 0.04 0.05
Grow Rice — — -0.02 0.06
Grow Cassava -3756.85* 1594.88 — —
Uses Paid Labor for Rice, Cassava, or
Sugar Cane Harvest 2383.26** 884.08 — —
Uses Pesticide or Herbicide 951.39 880.83 — —
Amount of Land Used for Farming
(in Wah, log) -202.31 156.55 — —
Position in Household Wealth Distribution
(Ref = Middle Third)
Bottom Third -5691.50*** 956.57 -0.16** 0.06
Top Third 3642.59*** 947.96 0.14* 0.06
Ever Lost Crops due to Flooding or Drought 629.67 1008.42 — —
N 4430
-2LL 52347.84
Standard Error of Estimate 21098.92 1022.6 — —
Correlations (ρ)b
Amount of Remittances — —
Skipped Generation Household 0.61 0.05 — —
NOTES: aRobust standard errors corrected for village-level clustering
bTests of Statistical Significance not Available
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (Two-Tailed Test)
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Consistent with expectations, the propensity for a household to receive
remittances is positively related to having a skipped generation household
structure. However, the effect of monetary remittances is questionable
given the sensitivity analysis results. Contrary to expectations, skipped
generation households receive lower amounts of monetary remittances
compared to non-skipped generation households.
Qualitative interviews suggest that extended relatives, especially ma-
ternal grandmothers (and to a lesser extent grandfathers and aunts) take
responsibility for caring for the children of absent migrants. Yet, quantita-
tive results suggest that the skipped generation structure is not associated
with the receipt of monetary remittances from migrants. Instead, remit-
tances are more likely to come in the form of in-kind remittances, which are
perhaps more suited to the specific needs of the children who are left behind.
Results contradict findings from a wider literature on inter vivos
transfers, which suggest that money is exchanged for help with services
(including childcare). My findings inform the literature on migrant remit-
tances by suggesting that although extended relatives who care for the
children of absent migrants may free the parental generation of the respon-
sibility of taking care of their children (thus making it possible for parents
to remain in migration destinations and to earn money), this provision of
services does not benefit the origin household monetarily (at least in
comparison to remittances related to other factors). Therefore, the childcare
provided by extended relatives is probably not due to an exchange motive,
but rather to feelings of obligation to care for their grandchildren, perhaps
stemming from an altruistic orientation toward family members. Indeed,
many of the interviewees expressed feeling duty bound to provide care for
their grandchildren, with whom they share blood ties.
This research implies that migrating parents, despite having a few
alternative childcare options, persist in relying on care from extended
relatives for help with childcare during a migration spell. As developing
countries like Thailand continue to transition to an urban industrial base,
future generations may begin to use formal childcare located closer to their
place of work. At the time of the study, formal childcare institutions were
not a mature industry in Thailand, but they may come into existence as
demand increases. Is it likely that the role of extended kin will diminish as
new formal childcare institutions replace this more traditional form of
childcare? Or will the skipped generation pattern persist where migration
remains heavy and formal childcare fails to address the needs of parents?
Future research is needed to determine if industrialization will con-
tinue to attract rural workers, and if their wages will rise to the point that
they can afford proper childcare at migration destinations. Further work is
also needed to determine the extent to which these findings can be general-
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ized to other settings. Important questions remain regarding whether this
pattern will characterize both internal migrants and international migrants,
especially given the difficultly that transnational parents face in crossing
international borders. This has implications for parental visitation and for
the migration of children seeking family reunification.
One potential policy implication of this research is that the Thai govern-
ment should provide aid and services to households having a skipped
generation structure. Given that they have to take on the burden of caring
for young children without the benefit of receiving substantially higher
monetary remittances, older people living in these households may struggle
to provide for the well-being of these children. As a consequence both the
children and grandparents may suffer emotionally and materially. Work in
Mexico by Dreby (2007) confirms that children experience negative conse-
quences, such as lower school performance and psychological distress,
resulting from prolonged separation from migrant parents. Moreover,
grandparents sometimes have difficulty controlling the bad behavior of
children who feel anxiety and disconnection due to their parents’ absence.
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